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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BONNEVILLE PROPERTIES 
INCORPORATED, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. No. 18223 
DAN SIMONS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant Dan Simons obtained a listing to 
sell real property known by the parties as the Fashion 
Fabrics Warehouse, which listing was advertised through the 
Multiple Listing Service of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors. 
Bonneville Properties, Inc., Plaintiff-Respondent, relying 
upon such listing and Simons' published commission split of 
sixty percent (60%) to the selling office and forty percent 
(40%) to the listing office, introduced the ultimate buyer 
of the warehouse to Simons. Subsequent to the introduction 
of such buyer by Bonneville to Simons, Simons reversed his 
commission split without knowledge of or agreement of 
Bonneville. When sale of the warehouse was consummated, 
Bonneville received forty percent (40%) of the corrunission 
then payable between the parties with sixty percent (60%) 
being paid to Simons. Bonneville thereafter brought this 
action against Simons for breach of contract and unjust 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
enrichment alleging damages for the additional twenty 
percent (20%) of commissions. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
judgment was granted in favor of Bonneville in the sum of 
$11,000.00 together with prejudgment interests and costs for 
a total award of $14,925.83. The Court concluded that 
Simons made an of fer for a contract and pursuant to such 
offer, Bonneville introduced to Simons the ultimate 
~urchaser of the Fashion Fabric Warehouse. Notwithstanding 
the consummation of the sale and purchase at a date 
subsequent to a unilated change of commission splits by 
Simons, the activities of Bonneville were significant to the 
sale entitling Bonneville to commissions based upon the 
original terms of sixty percent (60%) to the selling office. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Simons seeks a reversal of the district court's 
judgment in favor of Bonneville. Bonneville resists and 
opposes the relief sought by Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 25th day of September, 1974, the Defendant Dan 
Simons doing business as Real Estate Consultants obtained an 
exclusive listing of property known as the Fashion Fabrics 
Warehouse. Such listing was advertised through the Salt 
Lake Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service. At the 
date of publication of the Fashion Fabrics listing, Simons' 
-5-
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published commission split to members of the Multiple 
Listing Service was sixty percent (60%) to the selling 
office and forty percent (40%) to the listing office. Some 
time during the month of December, 1974, L. Richard Sorensen 
and Dennis Christensen, employees and agents of Bonneville 
Properties, Inc., each saw the Fashion Fabrics listing in 
the Multiple Listing Service and also became aware of the 
commission split as advertised and offered by the Defendant 
Simons. During the applicable periods of 1974 and 1975 
.Plaintiff Bonneville Properties, Inc. was authorized to act 
within the State of Utah as a corporate broker in that L. 
Richard Sorensen was licensed as a real estate broker for 
and on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Subsequent to the discovery of such listing, Bonneville 
was advised by Simons that Fashion Fabrics would be willing 
to accept an offer for purchase of the subject property at a 
price of $3,800,000.00, with a cash down payment of 
$850,000.00 and the balance of $2,950,000.00 payable in 
accordance with the terms of a real estate contract. 
Such terms would also include a lease back of the property 
by Fashion Fabrics. After being advised of the acceptable 
terms of an offer, the Plaintiff, by and through its agents 
L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis Christensen, met with Simons 
in December, 1974, at the offices of Gary Jenkins and at 
this meeting it was disclosed to Simons that A.K. Utah 
Properties was a prospective purchaser of the 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fashion Fabrics Warehouse. Simons admits in his pleadings 
that Bonneville introduced to him the party who purchased 
the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse. 
On the 2nd day of January, 1975, effective January 10, 
1975, Simons unilaterally revised his commission split 
arrangement by advising the Salt Lake Board of Realtors by 
letter that all commissions would thereafter be paid forty 
percent (40%) to the selling office and sixty percent (60%) 
to the listing office. On the effective date of such 
~hange, no written agreements had been reached between A.K. 
Utah Properties and Fashion Fabrics or A.K. Utah Properties 
and Robert Swanner Company regarding the sale of the subject 
property and an exchange which was to take place thereafter. 
Although Plaintiff's agent, Dennis Christensen, 
subsequent to the meeting in December, 1974, requested to be 
in attendance at all negotiations between Fashion Fabrics 
and A.K. Utah, Simons advised Mr. Christensen that he did 
not want him in attendance at such meetings. Nevertheless, 
as early as January 16, 1975, attorneys for A.K. Utah 
advised Fashion Fabrics and Defendant Dan Simons that they 
expressed an intent to purchase the Fashion Fabrics 
Warehouse subject to certain conditions and the preparation 
and execution of final documents. The intent as expressed a 
letter of January 16, 1975, providing essentially that the 
purchase was to be $3,800,000.00 with a down payment of 
$850,000.00. The balance of the purchase price, 
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$2,950,000.00 was payable in accordance with a terms of a 
real estate contract. Additional terms were set forth in 
the letter but included the lease back of the Fashion 
Fabrics Warehouse by Fashion Fabrics. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Simons' instructions to Mr. 
Christensen, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Sorensen were ready and 
willing at all times to offer assistance to the Defendant 
Simons with respect to the sale. 
In February, 1975, A.K. Utah Properties and Fashion 
Fabrics entered into contracts dated February 3, 1975, for 
the purchase and sale of the Fashion Fabric Warehouse. The 
contracts provided that A.K. Utah Properties would purchase 
the subject property at $3,800,000.00 with a down payment of 
$900,000.00 and the balance of $2,900,000.00 to be paid in 
accordance with the terms of a uniform land sales contract. 
Such contract further provided that Fashion Fabrics would 
lease back the subject property from the purchaser. A 
closing of the transaction and a conveyance of the property 
occurred on March 27, 1975. Immediately thereafter A.K. 
Utah exchanged the property with property owned by the 
Robert Swaner Company. 
As a result of the sale of the Fashion Fabrics 
Warehouse,, commissions totalling $125,000.00 became due and 
payable to the participating brokers, $100,000.00 of which 
is in dispute in the present action. Plaintiff was paid the 
sum of $40,000.00 representing forty percent (40%) of the 
-8-
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conunissions, all of which were paid in accordance with the 
conunission split arrangement which was effective as of the 
10th day of January, 1975. The Defendant Simons was paid 
conunissions totalling $60,000.00 ($38,000.00 in cash and 
$22,000.00 represented by 17,600 restricted shares of 
Fashion Fabric stock). Bonneville Properties received its 
last conunission payment on the 1st day of May, 1976. 
On or about June 3, 1976, Plaintiff's agent Dennis 
Christensen filed suit on his own behalf against the 
Defendant Simons in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah seeking damages for alleged violations of 
anti-trust laws of the United States alleging a conspiracy 
to deprive Christensen from his fair share of the real 
estate commission attributable to the sale of the Fashion 
Fabrics Warehouse and for a breach of contract. Plaintiff 
was not a party to the Federal action. On the 3rd day of 
December, 1976, and in settlement of such action, Dennis 
Christensen executed a general release of all of his claims 
in favor of the Defendant Simons with respect to any claims 
or causes of action attributable to the transaction 
involving the sale of Fashion Fabrics Warehouse. 
The commission arrangement and agreement which existed 
between the Plaintiff and its agent Dennis Christensen 
provided that Plaintiff was to receive ten percent (10%) of 
all commissions to defray costs with the remaining amount of 
-9-
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A. Plaintiff Bonneville has earned its commission by 
substantial performance. 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 45, sets forth the 
generally accepted principle that where substantial 
performance has been completed by an offeree, a unilateral 
contract becomes irrevocable for a specified or reasonable 
amount of time. Section 45 states: 
If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, 
and part of the consideration requested in the 
offer is given or tendered by the offeree in 
response thereto, the offeror is bound by a 
contract, the duty of immediate performance of 
which is conditional on the full consideration 
being given or tendered within the time stated 
in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein, 
within a reasonable time. 
Comment B provides further explanation. 
. . . The main of fer includes as a subsidiary 
promise, necessarily implied, that if part of 
the requested performance is given, the offeror 
will not revoke his offer, and that if tender is 
made it will be accepted. Part performance or 
tender may thus furnish consideration for the 
subsidiary. Moreover, merely acting in 
justifiable reliance on an offer may in some 
cases serve as sufficient reason for making a 
promise binding. (See Section 90.) 
The principles enumerated in the Restatement of 
Contracts have been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
matter of Auerbach's, Inc. vs. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 
-10-
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1977). There, the Court addressing the ability of an 
employer to withdraw an offer made to an employee for a 
pension after completion of years of service concluded that 
after substantial performance the of fer could not be 
withdrawn. At page 378, the Court concluded: 
According to Kimball this offer was extended to 
him by Auerbach's in the 1950's. Auerbach's 
contends it revoked the offer on April 26, 1971. 
Since Kimball had performed a substantial part 
of the performance required in Auerbach's 
alleged offer, the offeror could not withdraw 
the offer, and would be bound by its promise. 
(Citations omitted.) 
In the present controversy, Simons made a similar offer 
to Bonneville. Simons through the Multiple Listing Service 
offered that in the event another brokerage company were 
able to find a purchase of the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse 
that such brokerage company would be entitled to the payment 
of sixty percent (60%) of the commissions earned. Upon 
notice of such offer and after conununications with Simons, 
Bonneville, through its agents, disclosed to Simons a 
prospective purchaser. Subsequent to such performance on 
the part of Bonneville, Simons attempted to modify the terms 
of his prior offer by reducing the commission split payable 
to the selling office. Simons nevertheless agreed that the 
disclosure of the prospective buyer was "significant" with 
respect to this transaction. (TR.184) Therefore, in 
accordance with the rule set forth in the Restatement of 
Contracts and as adopted by the Supreme Court of the State 
-11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I ~ 
of Utah, the offer of Simons became irrevocable allowing 
Bonneville to thereafter supply the remaining consideration 
requested, assuming arguendo that any further efforts were 
required on the part of the Plaintiff. 
B. Bonneville Properties, Incorporated has Substantially 
Performed its Contract with the Defendant. 
There can be no dispute in the controversy before the 
Court that A.K. Utah Properties ultimately, for whatever 
reason, purchased the interests of Fashion Fabrics in the 
Fashion Fabrics Warehouse, and that as a result of such 
purchase, a commission became due and payable to Defendant, 
Dan Simons. Notwithstanding the admission of Simons that 
Bonneville was paid in accordance with the commission split 
in effect as of January 10, 1975, Simons now contends that 
Bonneville did not perform its agreements thereby precluding 
it from any claim to further payments. Simons asserts that 
Plaintiff is not entitled to additional commission because 
if failed to produce a written binding offer from a buyer 
ready, willing and able to purchase in accordance with the 
terms of the Simons' listing and that such offer did not 
exist as of the effective date of the assignment. It has 
been established, however, in the matter of Armstrong vs. 
J.H. Webber & Co., 158 P. 957 (Wash. 1916) that the law of 
procuring cause is not applicable with respect to suits 
between brokers or salesmen and brokers. See also Draft vs. 
Enos, 318 P. 2d 66 (Cal. App. 1957). What is significant and 
-12-
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determinative of the rights of the parties is the contract 
between the respective brokers. Armstrong, supra. In the 
instant case, the contract between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant is found to include the terms set forth in 
Paragraph 17 of the Multiple Listing Rules and Regulations. 
(Exhibit 3-P) 
When one member sells or exchanges property 
listed with the service by another member, the 
gross commission shall be divided on a 
previously agreed basis. 
The previously agreed basis, that published in the Multiple 
Listing Service, provided that sixty percent (60%) would be 
paid to the selling office. The issue in the present 
controversy then is whether or not the Plaintiff sold the 
property listed with the Defendant, and if not, whether such 
performance was excused by the conduct of the Defendant. 
The facts in the present controversy are most 
appropriately addressed by the law and facts as set forth in 
the matter of Bowie vs. Martin, 85 A.2d, 786 (Maryland 
1952). In that action, the plaintiff and defendant had 
agreed that if plaintiff were to sell certain property, 
plaintiff would be entitled to split a commission on a 50-50 
basis. The evidence established that the defendant had on 
numerous occasions previously contacted the ultimate 
purchasers and that these contracts occurred over a period 
of time from 1947 to May of 1950. Notwithstanding these 
contacts, the plaintiff showed the property in question to 
-13-
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IH 
the ultimate purchaser in April of 1950 and thereafter made 
several attempts to contact the defendant broker regarding a 
proposal for purchase. After these activities of the 
plaintiff, the prospective purchasers contacted the 
defendant broker directly with an offer and the defendant 
broker wrote the contract. (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, 
with some minor changes made by an attorney, the purchasers 
signed the agreement and purchased the property. The 
appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court which 
found that the plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the 
commission on the grounds that the purchasers went to the 
defendant as a result of the efforts and activities of the 
plaintiff. The Court further concluded that there was no 
evidence to justify any assertion by the defendant that the 
plaintiff was inactive or dilatory or acted in bad faith so 
as to preclude recovery. 
In the case before this Court, it is apparent and 
admitted by Simons that the activities of Bonneville were a 
"substantial" factor in consummating the sale between A.K. 
Utah and Fashion Fabrics. Although negotiations were 
conducted by others, as was the fact in the matter of Bowie 
vs. Martin, such negotiations would not have taken place but 
for the activities of Bonneville. As in the case of Bowie, 
there is no evidence to indicate that Bonneville was 
inactive, dilatory or acted in bad faith, but in fact, the 
evidence demonstrates that Bonneville, through its agents, 
-14-
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attempted to involve itself in negotiations, but was 
excluded ~y the request of Simons. Therefore, as in the 
matter of Bowie vs. Martin, the activities of Bonneville are 
sufficient to constitute a sale and Bonneville thereby 
earned its commission. By Simons's own conduct and 
admissions arising therefrom, such activities were 
sufficient for Fashion Fabrics and Simons to previously pay 
Bonneville $40,000.00 in accordance with the modified 
commission split arrangement. 
The conclusion that Bonneville is entitled to its 
commission is further substantiated by the facts of 
Armstrong vs. J.H. Webber & Co., supra. In that case, the 
plaintiff entered into a contract with a broker to receive 
50% of all commissions made through her efforts on sales of 
a rooming house and hotel. The plaintiff thereafter 
negotiated an exchange of an apartment and rooming house and 
was discharged by the defendant broker about the time that 
the transaction was consummated. Although the defendant 
broker closed the matter himself, the Court concluded that 
the evidence was sufficient to uphold the trial court's 
verdict that the plaintiff was entitled to payment of her 
commissions. This wus not withstanding the fact that the 
contract ultimately concluded between the parties differed 
in terms from the one originally talked about, since it was 
one continuous transaction from its origination to its 
consummation. 
-15-
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I~ 
Bonneville in this action is also entitled to an award 
of the additional commission on the principles set forth in 
the matter of Boyer vs. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). 
Although clearly addressing issues with respect to a 
brokerage arrangement between an owner and broker, the Court 
adopted the principle "that a party to a real estate listing 
agreement cannot prevent or interfere with the performance 
of the agreement and then assert the non-performance as a 
defense". Boyer Company, supra, at page 1114. The 
uncontroverted evidence established at trial in this matter 
demonstrates that Simons precluded Bonneville from further 
performing in assisting or otherwise negotiating with the 
respective parties to complete the sale. Therefore, Simons 
cannot now be heard to complain of any alleged 
non-performance on behalf of Bonneville. Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the fact that Bonneville did not participate 
in final negotiations does not necessarily preclude 
Bonneville from recovery. In discussing the issue of 
procuring cause between a broker and owner, the Utah Supreme 
Court in the matter of Frederick May & Company, Inc. vs. 
Dunn, 368 P.2d 266 (Utah 1962) stated at page 269: 
Usually, whether the broker first approaches, or 
brings to the attention of the buyer that the 
property is for sale, or brings the buyer into 
the picture, is considerable weight in 
determining whether the buyer (sic - broker?) is 
the procuring cause of sale. The fact that the 
sale was consummated without participation by 
the broker in the final negotiation does not 
-16-
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preclude him from recovering his commission if 
the sale was otherwise procured by him. 
All the principles enumerated above can best be 
summarized as stated by the Court in the matter of De 
Benedictis vs. D. Gerechoff, 339 A.2d 225 (N.J. App. 1975) 
at page 229: 
In co-broker agreements the broker who furnishes 
the buyer to the seller even though the ultimate 
sell is for a lesser price, is entitled to share 
in the commission provided, however, that there 
has been no significant breach in the 
negotiations. (Citations omitted.) 
In the matter before this Court, the evidence is clear 
and is admitted by Simons that Bonneville furnished the 
buyer to the seller. Furthermore, the evidence establishes 
that there was no break in negotiations between the parties 
and that in light of the introduction occurring in late 
December 1974 and a letter of intent being signed on January 
16, 1975, the matter went together very quickly after such 
introduction by Bonneville. The evidence clearly indicates 
that but for this introduction and notwithstanding the 
efforts of Simons the sale is directly attributable to 
Bonneville. Bonneville thus performed its original contract 
with Simons and as such is entitled to payment of an 
additional commission all in accordance with the original 
published commission split. 
-17-
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C. Bonneville is Presumed to be Capable of Completing its 
Contract with Simons. 
Simons implies that Bonneville, by its agent Dennis 
Christensen, was incapable of completing the sale between 
Fashion Fabrics and A.K. Utah and that this justified a 
change in the commission split precluding Bonneville from 
payment of any additional commission. Simons did not raise 
this matter as a defense in the pleadings, at trial or at a 
time when Bonneville was paid $40,000.00 as selling agent. 
Plaintiff now asserts that this issue is improperly before 
the Court. 
Notwithstanding Simons' failure to raise this issue, 
Bonneville asserts that resolution of the issue is in its 
favor. Simons ignores the facts established at trial as 
well as the statutory licensing requirements for brokers 
imposed by the State of Utah. Not only was Dennis 
Christensen to be involved in the sale and negotiations 
regarding the sale of the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse to A.K. 
Utah Properties, but L. Richard Sorensen, the official 
broker for Bonneville, was to be involved. Mr. Sorensen had 
met with Defendant Simons to discuss the terms of a proposed 
offer and later attended the meeting whereby Simons was 
advised of the potential purchaser. Mr. Sorensen expected 
to continue with the transaction, and in fact, made several 
telephone calls to monitor the progress of the transaction. 
As a licensed real estate broker for Bonneville, Mr. 
-18-
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Sorensen and Bonneville have been authorized by the State of 
Utah to engage in any activity of a real estate broker, as 
defined by Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended), including but not limited to the sale of 
industrial and commercial property. "With due regard for 
the paramount interest of the public," Mr. Sorensen was 
required to demonstrate to the real estate examiners prior 
to the issuance of his broker's license his honesty, 
integrity, truthfulness, reputation and his competency. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 61-2-6 (1953, as amended). By 
the mere act of licensing, the State of Utah has concluded 
that Mr. Sorensen and Bonneville have met certain levels of 
competency. This Court must, therefore, presume and 
conclude that where no evidence exists to the contrary 
Bonneville and Mr. Sorensen were competent. Simons neither 
raised Bonneville's competency as an issue nor offered any 
proof that Bonneville and/or L. Richard Sorensen were 
incapable of performing its contract with Simons. Beyond 
its statutory right to act as a broker, it is not 
Bonneville's obligation to prove its competency, but Simons' 
obligation to prove Bonneville's incompetency. Simons has 
totally failed to prove this fact. 
-19-
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II 
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO A.MEND HIS ANSWER 
SHOULD BE CONFIRMED 
As set forth in Defendant-Appellant's Brief, Simons 
requested leave to amend his Answer five days prior to 
trial. Simons's Motion was argued before the Court 
immediately prior to trial on August 31, 1981. As Simons 
stated in his brief, Bonneville opposed this Motion on the 
grounds that Bonneville was unprepared to offer any evidence 
.concerning the agency relationship which may have existed 
between A.K. Utah and Jelco. A particularly important 
witness, Gary Jenkins, was no longer residing within the 
State of Utah but in fact resided in Phoenix, Arizona. The 
representative of A.K. Utah at trial, Mr. Emanuel Floor, did 
not enter into his employment with A.K. Utah until January 
1, 1975, a time subsequent to the introduction. As a 
consequence, the Court denied Simons' Motion concluding that 
the prejudice to the Plaintiff outweighed the justice which 
might be served in allowing amendment to Simons' Answer. 
It is a well accepted principle of law that application 
for leave to amend a pleading is ordinarily addressed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court and that this discretion 
will not be disturbed upon appeal except in a case of abuse 
of such discretion. Benson vs. Oregon Shortline R. Co., 35 
U. 241, 99 P. 1072. The Utah Supreme Court has further 
stated that a more liberal rule would be applied in cases 
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where amendments are offered before trial than where offered 
during or after trial. At trial the parties might be taken 
by surprise or handicapped in the meeting of new 
allegations. Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, 89 U. 530, 57 P. 2d 
1132. 
In the case before the Court, Simons admitted in his 
pleadings, filed almost six (60) years before trial that 
Bonneville had introduced Simons to the party who purchased 
the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse. Simons' motion sought to 
amend this admission, thereafter denying the same. As a 
consequence, an issue would immediately have arisen 
concerning Gary Jenkins and Jelco's authority to act for and 
on behalf of A.K. Utah. This question of principle-agency 
relationship was not at issue during the discovery period of 
this case and was only raised by the motion of Simons 
immediately prior to trial. Inasmuch as Jelco's past 
representative was then residing in the State of Arizona and 
inasmuch as no representative of A.K. Utah was available for 
the applicable period of time, Bonneville was placed at 
great prejudice in presenting evidence of this potential 
issue at the time of trial. Bonneville had in fact relied 
upon the status of the pleadings for a period of 
approximately six· (6) years. To place such a major question 
at issue immediately prior to trial was unjustifiable. By 
the same argument, Simons' motion for leave to file an 
amendment to conform to the evidence was improper. With 
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Simons' admission, Bonneville was not obligated to introduce 
evidence of Jenkin's or Jelco's authority to act for A.K. 
Utah and the district court's refusal to grant Simons' 
motion was proper. 
III 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERRORS OCCURRED AT TRIAL REQUIRING REVERSAL 
OF THE COURT'S JUDGMENT 
A. Plaintiff had authority to prosecute this action. 
At trial, the Defendant moved to dismiss Bonneville's 
.action alleging that Bonneville lacked statutory authority 
to prosecute the same pursuant to the provisions of Section 
61-2-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). In 
essence, Simons asserted that Bonneville, as a corporation, 
was not duly licensed as a real estate broker and therefore 
could not maintain its action for recovery of the 
commission. In support of this motion, Simons filed the 
Affidavit of Mr. Steven Francis, Director of the Real Estate 
Division of the State of Utah. Thereafter, however, Mr. 
Francis testified and further explained the procedure for 
licensing of corporations. In this regard, the Court noted 
certain inconsistencies between Mr. Francis' Affidavit and 
his testimony thereafter ruling in favor of Bonneville's 
right to prosecute this action. 
Mr. Steven Francis explained that the Department of 
Business Regulation did not issue licenses to corporations 
per se but that they did issue licenses in the name of 
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corporations provided that simultaneously therewith a broker 
was designated broker for the corporation. Mr. Francis 
thereafter testified that this procedure was followed by 
Bonneville for the years 1974 and 1975 and that nothing 
further was required of Bonneville for the applicable 
periods of time. (TR. pages 210 - 216.) 
As such, Bonneville was licensed as a broker and had 
performed all activities required of it by the Department of 
Business Regulations. Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended), provides that a real estate broker can 
be a corporation and where Bonneville has satisfied the 
State of Utah it must be treated as such. Certainly, this 
compliance would allow Bonneville to prosecute this action 
as a real estate broker. 
B. Denial of Proof regarding Custom and Usage was Proper. 
21 Am Jur 2d, Customs ahd Usages, Section 31, sets 
forth: 
Where a custom or usage is a special or 
particular one, where is local in character, the 
party who proposes to rely upon it is required 
to aver it in his pleadings; otherwise he 
cannot, or the objection of this adversary, 
prove it. 
Such a rule has equal application to a defendant. 
In the present controversy, Simons made a general 
denial regarding the existence of a contract between 
Bonneville and himself. At trial, however, Simons' counsel 
made an attempt to introduce evidence regarding custom and 
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usage among real estate brokers in the area of commercial 
and industrial real estate. Bonneville objected to the 
introduction of such evidence based upon Simons' failure to 
plead the same. Bonneville asserts that the very reason for 
requiring custom and usage to be specifically plead is to 
give the opposing party an opportunity to talk with 
witnesses, to determine the existence of custom and usage, 
and if the same exists to obtain witnesses to testify 
concerning the same. Where a custom is not of such 
?Otariety among the world that the Court and the public can 
take notice of it, notice pleading requires that the custom 
be specifically pleaded. Because the custom Simons wished 
to rely upon was not of such general knowledge, introduction 
of evidence regarding the same amounted to surprise to 
Bonneville, which surprise would have resulted in prejudice 
.to Bonneville. Be~ause Simons did not specifically plead 
this defense, the Court's ruling was appropriate and no 
evidence exists to show that the Court's discretion was 
abused. 
C. Plaintiff is Entitled to Prejudgment Interest. 
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
provided during the applicable dates of this suit that : 
The legal rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods or things in 
action shall be six percent (6%) per annum. 
This Court has previously held in actions for breach of 
contract or for actions upon debts overdue, that interest at 
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
six percent (6%) per annum is allowable. See Salt Wet Wash 
Laundry vs. Colorado Animal By-products Co., 104 U. 385, 140 
P.2d 344. Wasatch Min. Co. vs. Crescent Min. Co., 7 U. 8, 
24 P. 586, Affirm 151 U.S. 317, 338 Lawyer Ed. L.Ed. 177, 14 
S. Ct. 348. As a consequence, the Court concluded that 
Bonneville was entitled to prejudgment interest at six 
percent (6%) per annum from the 1st day of May, 1976, the 
date Bonneville was to receive final payment upon all other 
commissions. 
D. Bonneville has not Waived any Claim for Commissions. 
Simons asserts that because Bonneville's real estate 
agent, Dennis Christensen, brought an action in the federal 
court directly against Simons for alleged anti-trust 
violations, that such suit necessarily precludes the claim 
of Bonneville. The evidenced adduced at trial clearly shows 
that the releases granted were granted by Dennis 
Christensen, individually, and in no way purported to be a 
release of any claims that Bonneville may have had against 
Simons. 
Section 61-2-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
provides: 
No person, partnership, association or 
corporation shall bring or maintain an action in 
any court of this state for the recovery of 
commission, a fee or compensation for any act 
done or service rendered the doing or rendering 
of which is prohibited under the provision of 
this act to other than licensed real estate 
brokers, unless such person was duly licensed 
hereunder as a real estate broker at the time of 
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the doing of such act or the rendering of such 
service. 
As such, the claim for commissions as asserted in this 
action belonged to Bonneville and only to Bonneville. 
Because Dennis Christensen was not an agent of Bonneville 
for purposes of the federal court action, nor did he purport 
to be, nothing transpiring therein including the release 
granted by Dennis Christensen can be binding upon the 
Plaintiff Bonneville as it relates to its claim. 
Even at trial, Simons simply asserted that Bonneville 
was precluded from recovering the amount due Christensen 
(Transcript 324). Certainly, such release of an individual 
cannot be extended to a former principal for which the 
former agent had no present authority. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a well established rule within the State of Utah 
that the Suprem~~~ouii will review the evidence and all 
inferences to be drawn from such evidence most favorable to 
the findings of the trier of fact. Smith vs. Gallegos, 16 
Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965). Upon examination of the 
evidence in this light, one must conclude that as a result 
of the contract offer made by the Defendant Dan Simons, as 
published in the Salt Lake Board of Realtors Multiple 
Listing Service, the Plaintiff became entitled to the 
payment of cornmis~i6ns totalling $60,000.00 as a result of 
i~s efforts in finding a buyer who purchased the Fashion 
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Fabrics Warehouse. The Defendant Simons agreed that this 
activity was significant, significant enough that the 
Plaintiff was paid commissions according to the commission 
split effective January 10, 1975, in the sum of $40,000.00. 
Because the Plaintiff was precluding from changing the 
commission split once substantial performance had been made 
by Bonneville, Bonneville was entitled to judgment against 
the Defendant Dan Simons for the additional sum of 
$20,000.00, minus $9,000.00, the amount released by Dennis 
Christensen. Upon the sum of $11,000.00, Bonneville is 
entitlted to interest thereon at the legal rate from the 
date that Defendant was otherwise entitled to payment of 
interest. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /2- day of October, 1982. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /L- day of October, 1982, 
I 
two copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent 
were hand-delivered to Parker M. Neilson and Mary Lou Godbe, 
318 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, attorneys 
for Defendant-Appellant. 
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